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Issues of Ukrainian Self-Identification from the Perspective of Bohdan Lepkyĭ: An Attempt at Recapitulation. A Commentary to Bohdan Lepkyĭ's Article "Kilka zagadnień z literatury ukraińskiej" [On Some Issues of Ukrainian Literature] (1933)

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Abstract

This paper is a commentary to an article by the Ukrainian writer, social and cultural activist Bohdan Lepkyĭ, published in *Sprawy Narodowościowe* in 1933. The article under discussion describes the significance of the developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for Ukrainian culture and national self-identification, with an emphasis on the growth and flowering of Ukrainian literature in this period. In her comments on Lepkyĭ's article, the author focuses on present-day markers of Ukrainian cultural identity.

Keywords: Ukrainian self-identification; Ukrainian culture; Ukrainian literature; markers of Ukrainian national identity

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Since 2014, as a consequence of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the international community's interest in Ukrainian culture, history, language, literature, and the issue of national identity has increased significantly, and following the full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, it has probably reached the highest level since Ukraine's independence in 1991.

This thirst for knowledge is evidenced above all by the dynamic development of Ukrainian studies abroad, for instance at Harvard University,[1] as well as by the growing interest of researchers from all over the world in Ukrainian issues, which finds its expression, for example, in lectures, conferences, and seminars (e.g. those organized by the Association for the Study of Nationalities). It is also clearly visible in numerous publications presenting the latest achievements in the field: the volume entitled *The Battle for Ukrainian: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Michael S. Flier and Andrea Graziosi, contains 24 solid academic studies devoted to the status and features of the Ukrainian language (Flier & Graziosi, 2017). In turn, the book *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Age of Extremes: An Intellectual Biography of Dmytro Dontsov* by the American researcher Trevor Erlacher presents a vision of the roots of Ukrainian nationalism and provides a contemporary contextualization of the work of Dmytro Dontsov, the leading ideologue of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Erlacher, 2021).

Consequently, it would not be wrong to think that despite the tragic circumstances of Russian aggression against Ukraine, Ukrainian culture is flourishing, especially when it comes to the process of national self-identification and the development of modern markers of Ukrainian identity.

It is precisely the flowering of Ukrainian culture and literature in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the markers of Ukrainian identity at the time, that Bohdan Lepkyĭ (1872–1941) draws attention to in his article. At the beginning, the author – who should rather be called a Western Ukrainian-Polish writer, poet, translator, and public figure – writes about a cultural difference between representatives of Eastern Ukraine (calling them "Ukrainians from Kyiv") and those of Western Ukraine ("Galician Ukrainians") (Łepki, 1933, p. 322). At that time, the territory of Ukraine belonged to two different empires – Russian and Austro-Hungarian – and thus distinctions between Ukrainians were obvious: Lepkyĭ writes that "the differences between the Russian and Austrian partitions were enormous in every respect" (Łepki, 1933, p. 321) and "Kyiv was more Moscovized" (Łepki, 1933, p. 322). In this way, he notes that the differences between eastern and western Ukraine are determined by the level of dependence on Moscow.

Ninety years have passed since the article was written and the circumstances have changed radically. But although Ukraine has long been territorially united, the issue of the division into the areas of "eastern" and "western" values still remains relevant. In his collection of essays *Ukraine between East and West* (1996), Ihor Ševčenko notes that ulti-

1 There is an entire research institute there that focuses on Ukrainian issues – the Ukrainian Research Institute, which is a publisher of the journal *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*.

mately this ambivalence "carried a potential danger: the loss of the unity of the Ukrainian nation" (Ševčenko, 1996, p. 5). However, considering the cultural and political situation in Ukraine in 1848–1900, Bohdan Lepkyĭ writes:

> First of all, it was understood [in Ukrainian society at the time] (apart from Muscophiles, who were increasingly losing ground) that on both banks of the Zbruch there lived one Ukrainian nation, speaking the same language, with the same traditions and customs, with the same worldview, and with the same predispositions for development and progress in the future. (Łepki, 1933, pp. 324–325)

This means that despite the political-territorial division and the constant danger of irreversible cultural division, there was still something that united Ukrainians.

When describing the sources of Ukrainian national authenticity, Ševčenko writes in the conclusion of his essay collection as follows:

> From several roots, among which were the Byzantine ones […] and the Western ones, […] a Ukrainian culture and consciousness had evolved by 1700 […]. Not only the Ukrainian elite themselves, but also their non-Ukrainian contemporaries saw the inhabitants of *Ukrajina* or of *Malorossija* as linguistically, culturally, and, at times, politically distinct from their Polish, Lithuanian, and Muscovite neighbours. (Ševčenko, 1996, p. 194)

In other words, Ukrainians are ultimately not two different nations, "eastern" and "western", and nor are they two cultural types of the same nation. They are one nation whose mentality combines two cultural principles and, as such, amounts to an original cultural phenomenon which constitutes the essence of Ukrainian national identity.

Lepkyĭ also touches on the subject of the unity of the Ukrainian nation (i.e. western and eastern Ukrainians) during the First World War. He emphasizes that the eastern and western Ukrainians went to the war "for the Tsar and for the Kaiser", but they did so "under duress" (Łepki, 1933, p. 326). Lepkyĭ comments as follows: "Soon, however, the same war pushed the combatants into fraternal embrace" (Łepki, 1933, p. 327). Describing the situation in 1914, he writes: "There was not a patch of Ukrainian land where bloody struggles for freedom and independence, for the unity of the nation torn into pieces did not take place" (Łepki, 1933, p. 327).

The above observations invite comparisons with the current situation in Ukraine, when Ukrainian society has attempted to consolidate in the face of Russian military aggression. This is the case despite the fact that the problem of mental, linguistic, and cultural differences between "western" and "eastern" Ukrainians has not disappeared even ninety years after the article was written. Indeed, to this day, mental conflicts between Ukrainians who have the respective markers of "eastern" and "western" ways of thinking and worldview have not vanished; what is more, they may have become more pronounced under the influence of the war. What comes as evidence of the salience and importance of this issue today is the public outrage caused in late autumn 2023 by the statement of the Ukrainian linguist Iryna Farion, who claimed that using the Russian language in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is

absolutely unacceptable (*Movnyĭ skandal iz Irynoiu Farion*, 2023). Such a mental conflict and the involvement of many forces and actors in it would certainly indicate an internal national split. However, in 2022, according to the National Institute for Strategic Studies, "an unprecedented consolidation of Ukrainian civil society in counteracting the Russian invasion" was observed (*Bezpretsedentna konsolidatsiia ukraïns'koho hromadians'koho suspil'stva u protydiï rosiĭs'komu vtorhnenniu*, 2022), and currently nothing has changed in this respect, according to the report of the independent think tank Cedos of 16 March 2023 (Cedos, 2023). This is a contemporary paradox of Ukrainian reality, where the division into "western" and "eastern" types of mentality is also reflected in literature and is a feature of the "Ukrainian phenomenon of national identity", to use the term proposed by Mykhaĭlo Stepyko (2011, p. 8).

Lepkyĭ also draws attention to the section of society which he calls "conservative Ukrainians", who used the terms *russkie* (Russians) and *Rus'* to refer to Ukrainians and Ukraine. There were circles of Russified Ukrainian intellectuals who – "under the influence of Russian agitation" (Łepki, 1933, p. 323) – considered their native language to be of secondary importance, did not want to use it in the press and literature, and opposed the new Ukrainian spelling rules. What Lepkyĭ refers to here is the so-called Kharkiv orthography of 1928, approved by the people's commissar of education of the Ukrainian SSR Mykola Skrypnyk during the Bolshevik Ukrainization campaign (*Ukraïns'kyĭ pravopys*, 1929). The conservative milieu he writes about had a Russophile cultural orientation and did not conceal it – on the contrary, they demonstrated it openly. For them, what formed the basis of "unity" with Russia was membership in the Russian Orthodox Church. Lepkyĭ notes that this was the reason for the debate about why some Ukrainians did not want to be called *russkie* (Łepki, 1933, p. 323).

The reference to the 1928 census and the reluctance of the pro-Russian "conservative Ukrainians" to use the new Ukrainian orthography is very important. Eighty-five years after this article was published, in 2019, Ukraine finally adopted the latest version of Ukrainian spelling rules, introducing all the changes that Ukrainian society did not dare to accept before (Natsional'na akademiia nauk Ukraïny, 2019). This is the fifth version of modern Ukrainian orthography, which marks a return to the Kharkiv one and at the same time incorporates significant differences from the Russian language.

However, the reform was met with resistance in Ukrainian society and with a wave of rejection from part of the population: a number of organizations and individuals filed several lawsuits against the new spelling rules, and the Kyiv District Administrative Court adjudicated that the government decision which introduced them was null and void (*Rishennia vid 28.01.2021 po spravi № 640/9824/19 Okruzhnyĭ administratyvnyĭ sud mista Kyieva*, 2021). The lawsuits took a few years until, in mid-2021, the Court of Appeal in Kyiv upheld the claim of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and overturned the effective ban on the new spelling from 2019 (*Apeliatsiĭnyĭ sud vyznav protypravnoiu vidminu novoho pravopysu*, 2021). Nevertheless, "the problem of Ukrainian orthography" (as it was referred to in the court case) became one of the most publicized in the history of independent Ukraine.

And although Lepkyĭ places this information in a footnote, in my opinion it is one of the most interesting points in his article. Indeed, eighty-five years later we can see a continuation of this socio-cultural situation, a continuation of the struggle for Ukrainian national self-identification. We can also see surprisingly similar anti-Ukrainian forces in contemporary society, on whose support Russia could probably count when it decided to launch a full-scale invasion of a sovereign neighboring state.

It is also worth noting two other observations Lepkyĭ makes in this context in the same footnote. Firstly, he writes that those who "were increasingly leaning towards pro-Russian orientation" did so "under the influence of Russian agitation" (Łepki, 1933, p. 323). This means that Russian imperial propaganda was actively used in Ukraine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to artificially create anti-Ukrainian forces. The same has also been the case in the already independent Ukraine since 1991 until the present, including the times of Russian military aggression.

Let us refer to a recent collective study entitled *Re-viziia istoriĭ: Rosiĭs'ka istorychna propahanda ta Ukraïna* [Re-Vision of History: Russian Historical Propaganda and Ukraine] (2020), which comes as an expression of the idea that history repeats itself and that "history is something that keeps happening to us" (IErmolenko, 2019, p. 4). In this study, the authors analyze current Russian propaganda and identify a number of narratives, such as "Ukraine is the unfortunate shadow of Russia", "Ukraine is the outskirts of Russia", "Ukrainians are Russians" (IErmolenko, 2019, pp. 12–13). Perhaps the group of "conservative Ukrainians", as Lepkyĭ delicately calls them, are none other than historical supporters of those narratives. And, unfortunately, in modern Ukraine the number of those who support this propaganda has not decreased compared to the times described by Lepkyĭ. Today, Ievhen Holybard aptly observes this phenomenon in his diary *Zlochynna ruka Rosiï v Ukraïni* [Russia's Criminal Hand in Ukraine] (2015): he notes that with the outbreak of the war in 2014 "the enemies of independent Ukraine became bolder with their openly anti-Ukrainian philippics […]. The line of […] pro-Russian chameleons does not get any shorter, […]. […] anti-Ukrainian propaganda has been intensified by Russian-speaking 'refugees' [this refers to some of the first refugees from the Donbas after the Russian aggression in the region in 2014: those with pro-Russian views]" (Holybard, 2015, p. 340).

Another interesting observation Lepkyĭ makes on the topic of "conservative Ukrainians" is the fact that they relied on the slogans of "one Russian nation" and "one Russian Orthodox Church". As in my comment above, it is again appropriate to use a quotation from the modern lexicon of Russian propaganda and historical falsities, commented on by the authors of *Re-viziia istoriï*, namely "the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has no grounds for independence" (IErmolenko, 2019, p. 15). Once again, the group of Ukrainians mentioned by Lepkyĭ became the historical victim of a trap – this time, imperial manipulations regarding Ukrainian Orthodoxy, religion, and the "original common Russian Orthodox Church".

Lepkyĭ was not Orthodox himself. Perhaps this is why, when discussing religious topics in his article, he does not mention the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church,

established and actively operating in 1919–1937, which has fought against the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine since the First All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council (*sobor*) in Kyiv in 1921 until today, and is one of the key markers of Ukrainian self-identification and national identity (Shurkhalo, 2021). For a hundred years, this Church has been a symbol of the Ukrainian national idea and the struggle for the spiritual liberation of Ukraine from Russian influence (Ishchuk, n.d.).

Today, unfortunately, the issue of fighting Russian falsehoods and propaganda fabrications is just as pressing in Ukrainian society, and the topic of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church is skillfully used to zombify the uneducated, i.e. those unfamiliar with the history of Ukrainian Orthodoxy due to the suppression of information by the Soviet authorities or its deliberate distortion by Moscow priests. Due to their lack of education, such people do not have the opportunity or feel the need to verify information and thus often reproduce pro-Russian narratives about "one Church":

> One topic of Russian propaganda that has become much more salient over the last year is the issue of religion, namely the topic of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. Considering the granting of the Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine […], the claim of Russian propaganda is that there is only one canonical Church in Ukraine – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church. (IErmolenko, 2019, p. 15)

This issue has become particularly acute during the ongoing Russian military aggression and provoked a number of high-profile events which led to physical confrontation, such as the outrage caused by the eviction of Moscow priests from the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves. Although the priests openly justified Russian aggression (*Pidtrymka putina*[2] *i znyknennia dorohotsinnykh ikon*, 2022), many Ukrainians expressed their indignation at the eviction and even physically defended the Russian church in central Kyiv. As Holybard aptly notes, some Ukrainians "do their anti-Ukrainian work, often without even realizing it" (Holybard, 2015, p. 326). It is this category of Ukrainians, most often poorly educated, that I consider to be the most popular target and also the victim of Russian religious propaganda, especially at the present time.

At this point, we should note Lepkyĭ's brilliant comment on the role of religion in Ukrainian self-identification:

> The division into […] "Tsar's" and "Kaiser's" Ukrainians was slowly disappearing [before World War I]. What remained was a difference of religion. Ukrainians from the Russian partition were Orthodox, while those from the Austrian partition were […] Uniates. […] their nature is characterized by a kind of religious tolerance: the Ukrainian is attached to his own Church, but he is not hostile towards a foreign one. (Łepki, 1933, p. 326)

Religious tolerance, emphasized by Lepkyĭ, remains an important feature of the Ukrainian national character, and it is for this reason that contemporary Ukrainians (as I have already

2 Original spelling.

mentioned, mainly those poorly educated) become victims of various forms of Moscow propaganda. Stepan Pavliuk[3] diagnosed the situation long before the dramatic events related to religion as follows: "The instructions of the clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate are aimed at the erosion of national identity […], in which the Russian geopolitical accent is clearly visible" (Pavliuk, 2003, p. 10). However, today, unfortunately, even during the war, the question of the existence and "activities" of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine is not resolved, and it still actively operates in the country.

To continue the topic of Ukrainian cultural relations with Russians, let us look again at the turn of the twentieth century, that is, the period of dynamic national and cultural development described by Lepkyĭ. He writes about the attempts of "progressive", "revolutionary" Russians (referring to the Russian socialist intelligentsia of the day) to form an alliance with Ukrainians in Galicia with a view to pursuing the fight against the tsarist regime together: "Russian revolutionary circles still called for joint action for liberation under the International" (Łepki, 1933, p. 323). However, as Lepkyĭ emphasizes, "not everyone wanted to or could believe it" – Ukrainians were in favor of the national idea: "the national stream was winning" (Łepki, 1933, p. 323).

At this point, it is worth recalling the words of another Ukrainian writer, Lepkyĭ's contemporary Volodymyr Vynnychenko. Lepkyĭ mentions him later in the article, referring to his work as one of the most outstanding achievements of Ukrainian literature of the time. In his "Odkrytyĭ lyst do rosiĭs'kykh pys'mennykiv" [Open Letter to Russian Writers] (1913), Vynnychenko – who, incidentally, is credited with saying that "Russian democracy ends where the Ukrainian question begins" – writes about the situation described by Lepkyĭ as follows:

> Through the thick, perennial crust of darkness and lawlessness, national life flows in all parts of Ukraine. The government [i.e. the Russian tsarist regime] is busy plugging up any nasty holes. […] Despite similar attempts by the Polish nobility, the [Ukrainian] movement keeps growing even more strongly in Austrian Ukraine – in Galicia. The press, literature, and science develop. A Ukrainian university is about to open in Lviv. In the Austrian parliament, the Ukrainian group is becoming more and more important every day. (Vynnychenko, 1913, p. 3)

The only difference in Vynnychenko's assessment is that he does not avoid "gloomy colors" in his picture of the situation of the Ukrainian nation at the time. In the same letter he notes: "But Russian writers are strangely conservative towards Ukrainians; more than the Russian government" (Vynnychenko, 1913, p. 3). In his famous pamphlet *Revoliutsiia v nebezpetsi!* [The Revolution is in Danger!] (1920) he is no longer so restrained in his assessment of relations with the Russian intelligentsia and Russian "revolutionaries", who at that time actively called on Ukrainians to join in the common fight against the tsarist regime:

3 Stepan Pavliuk is the Director of the Institute of Ethnology at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

> […] the syphilis of Russian chauvinism entered the blood of Russian citizenship. We will not be mistaken when we say that 99% of the Russian bourgeois intelligentsia stood on the position of complete negation of the Ukrainian nation, and 98% of the Russian socialist intelligentsia of all party shades stood on the same position. (Vynnychenko, 1920, pp. 41–42)

If Vynnychenko's formulation is taken in conjunction with Lepkyĭ's claims – then the "syphilis of Russian chauvinism" would explain the reluctance of Ukrainians in Galicia to respond to the calls of their Russian "socialist colleagues", which Lepkyĭ writes about.

If we draw analogies to the present, it will be appropriate to refer to another writer, Vadym Denysenko. In his book *Iak zruĭnuvaty russkiĭ mir* [How to Destroy the Russian World] (2023), he notes that the key features of the ideology of the Russian World (*russkiĭ mir*) include

> the amorphous nature of the descriptions of the Russian World and the absence of any picture of the future. It is this amorphousness and this uncertainty of the future that make it possible to drag absolutely everything into the Russian World. And the absence of the future and the absolute dominance of the past as a prototype of the golden age make it possible to build the future only as a reconstruction of the past, with all the relevant possibilities for manipulation. (Denysenko, 2023, p. 38)

In the light of this observation, it becomes clear why Ukrainians found it impossible to establish friendly relations even with pro-democratic Russians, both in the times of Lepkyĭ and Vynnychenko and in the current historical situation today.

When Lepkyĭ writes about the success and development of Ukrainian literature of this period, his eyes seem to shine: "It was the greatest triumph that Ukrainian literature has achieved" (Łepki, 1933, p. 329), and even the stage of cultural decline that followed soon afterwards, in the "Soviet" period, was, according to Lepkyĭ, "a dream amid the bloody reality" (Łepki, 1933, p. 329).

This is what happened to Ukrainian literature later, which means that Lepkyĭ was right. Under Soviet rule, authentic Ukrainian literature experienced a long period of decline and oblivion; there was a ban on many outstanding Ukrainian writers, including those whom Lepkyĭ mentions in his article as well as those who were born or wrote in later times. Ukraine also experienced the physical elimination of the most talented and worthy representatives of its culture and literature by the Soviet authorities, the first stage of which took place during Lepkyĭ's lifetime, in 1934–1937.

There was the tragic fate of the "Executed Renaissance"[4] and there were "blank spots" in Ukrainian literature and history: the executed and imprisoned Ukrainian artists and public figures who were unjustly forgotten in Soviet times and forbidden to be mentioned. This was part of the Ukrainian cultural heritage which the nation was barbarously deprived

4 The Executed Renaissance (*rozstrilane vidrodzhennia*, lit. 'the Shot Renaissance') is a term used by the Ukrainian critic and publicist Iuriĭ Lavrinenko with reference to an entire generation of Ukrainian writers and artists who were executed or repressed by the Soviet authorities in 1934–1937 (see Lavrinenko, 1959).

of by the Soviet regime. The Ukrainian writers whom Lepkyĭ calls the most outstanding representatives of the literature of his time were executed or forced into exile, and their works, and even mention of them, were strictly banned by Soviet literary criticism until Ukraine gained independence. The list of those who eventually became "blank spots" includes Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951), Mykola Khvylovyĭ (1893–1933), Mykola Voronyĭ (1871–1938), Oleksandr Oles' (1878–1944), Ievhen Malaniuk (1897–1968), Spyrydon Cherkasenko (1876–1940), Volodymyr Samiĭlenko (1864–1925), Ievhen Pluzhnyk (1898–1936), Natalia Livyts'ka (1902–2005), Havryïl Kostel'nyk (1886–1948), Roman Kupchynskyĭ (1894–1976), Mykola Zerov (1890–1937). It was only in the 1990s that these iconic figures of Ukrainian literature returned to textbooks and the canon. And although more than one generation of young Ukrainians has now grown up for whom these names are quite obvious, the threat of "a dream amid the bloody reality" looms over the nation again: the first thing the Russians do in the occupied territories is burn works of Ukrainian literature, declare them "extremist", and ban the use of the Ukrainian language (Beniuk, 2023).

It is hardly surprising, then, that Lepkyĭ compares the historical and cultural situation at the time to "a storm that was and is still raging over Ukraine" (Łepki, 1933, p. 332), and this assessment is surprisingly relevant also today. He concludes his article on a philosophical note: "nothing is certain except God in heaven and the misery of existence on earth. If the entire world is complaining, what is Ukraine supposed to do?" (Łepki, 1933, p. 332), which can also be considered a relevant observation on Ukraine's position in the international arena at the end of 2023.

This "philosophical impotence" or the apathy of the article's conclusions can be partly explained by the year of its publication: in 1933, a terrible famine was raging in Soviet Ukraine, during which four million people died. Known as the Great Famine of 1932–1933 (*Holodomor*, lit. 'death by hunger'), it was orchestrated by Stalin and his criminal accomplices (cf. Stasiuk et al., 2017), and it was aimed primarily at the destruction of Ukrainian identity, which Lepkyĭ must have realized. The times that he writes about in his article are probably not a random choice: they were the times of the short-lived flowering of Ukrainian literature, language, and the national idea at the turn of the century – he might have found some solace and consolation in the nostalgia for those times in the year 1933, which was so tragic for the Ukrainian nation (cf. IUkhnovs'kyĭ et al., 2008). What followed was the first wave of executions of Ukrainian intelligentsia in the Ukrainian SSR, which reached its peak in 1934–1937, and, shortly afterwards, in 1939, the Soviet annexation of western Ukrainian lands, which were so dear to Lepkyĭ. Considering that all this happened during his lifetime, it is not difficult to explain his inclination to philosophical "open endings".

And the Ukrainian national self, the issue of Ukrainian self-identification, has invariably remained an open question for the many centuries of Ukrainian history and has periodically intensified, as was the case in the times of Bohdan Lepkyĭ and as is the case today. Considering this peculiarity, Vynnychenko, whom I have mentioned above, writes as follows:

> One cannot read Ukrainian history without taking bromide – it is such a tragic, senseless, and clumsy history, and it is so painful, horrible, bitter, and sad to read how the only thing that this unfortunate, harassed, downtrodden nation has done during the entire time of its state (or semi-state) existence was defend itself from all sides […]. The whole history is a series, an endless, uninterrupted series of uprisings, wars, conflagrations, famines, attacks, military coups, intrigues, quarrels, and schemes. Is it not the same today? (Vynnychenko, 1980, p. 285)

Summing up, it can be undoubtedly concluded that Bohdan Lepkyĭ's article has not lost its relevance, especially in the light of the problems of Ukrainian national self-identification, which have become much more acute during the ongoing Russian aggression.

Translated from Polish by Piotr Styk

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Problemy ukraińskiej samoidentyfikacji w ujęciu Bohdana Łepkiego: próba rekapitulacji. Komentarz do artykułu Bohdana Łepkiego *Kilka zagadnień z literatury ukraińskiej* (1933)

Abstrakt

Tekst stanowi komentarz do artykułu ukraińskiego pisarza, działacza społecznego i kulturalnego Bohdana Łepkiego, opublikowanego w 1933 roku w „Sprawach Narodowościowych". Omawiany artykuł opisuje znaczenie końca XIX i początku XX wieku dla kultury ukraińskiej i narodowej samoidentyfikacji Ukraińców, ze szczególnym naciskiem na rozwój i rozkwit literatury ukraińskiej w tym okresie. W komentarzu autorka skupia się na obecnych markerach ukraińskiej tożsamości kulturowej.

Słowa kluczowe: ukraińska samoidentyfikacja; kultura ukraińska; literatura ukraińska; markery ukraińskiej tożsamości narodowej

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